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I. INTRODUCTION 
"First Come, Last Served."2 
"It's depressing that ... [Alaska Governor Tony Knowles] fights re-
spected Native elder Katie John in federal court over the few fish 
ANILCA guarantees her to sustain her family." 3 
"As Alaska's governor, I believe it is my clear responsibility, even in 
the face of a difficult political battle, to vigorously defend this important 
aspect of state sovereignty."4 
The above are merely a small sampling of arguments in the heated 
debate currently occurring in Alaska over Governor Tony Knowles's re-
cent decision to appeal the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case Katie 
John v. United States5 to the Ninth Circuit en bane. The case concerns 
the creation of a priority for subsistence fishing rights for rural residents 
and whether the federal or state government should manage the fisheries. 
The Ninth Circuit was asked to determine what the definition of "public 
lands" means in the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 
(ANILCA).6 The court determined that "public lands" in ANILCA in-
cluded navigable waterways in and adjacent to federal lands in which the 
* Copyright© 2001 by Ryan T. Peel. 
I. See Katie John v. United States, 72 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1995). It is important to note that 
the actual title of the case is "State of Alaska v. Babbitt". As will be explained later, Katie John was 
a plaintiff in a similar case against the United States; the two cases were consolidated. Since most 
Alaskans know this infamous case as "Katie John v. United States", this note will refer to the case as 
such. 
2. Liz Ruskin, Rural Cause, City Streets; Downtown March Carries the Bannerfor Subsis-
tence, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 4, 2000, at A I. The quote is from a protestor's sign. 
3. Eric Johnson, Letters from the People, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 30, 2000, at 88. 
4. Tony Knowles, Katie Johns Appeal is About State Sovereignty, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, Mar. 3, 2000, at 812. Governor Knowles wrote an "Op-Ed" piece explaining his recent ac-
tions. 
5. Katie John v. United States, 72 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 516 U.S. 1036 
(1996), and cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1187 (1996) [hereinafter Katie John Ill]. 
6. /d. The text of ANCILA is codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (1994). 
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federal government has a reserved water right.7 As a result, the court 
found that the federal government must intercede on behalf of the rural 
residents to protect their right to priority subsistence fishing. 8 As such, on 
October 1, 1999, the federal government took control of subsistence fish-
ing on federal lands in Alaska.9 
On January 27, 2000, Governor Knowles decided to appeal the five-
year old decision, citing not the desire to destroy subsistence priority, but 
to curtail the "unprecedented expansion of federal control over navigable 
waters that has not been applied in other states, and one that could be ex-
tended beyond subsistence issues in the future." 10 The Ninth Circuit, on 
July 14, 2000, agreed to hear the case en bane; 11 oral arguments were 
held on December 20, 2000. 
This note will present a detailed historical and political background 
explaining the atmosphere in which Katie John Ill was decided, includ-
ing an explanation of subsistence hunting and fishing and its impact on 
the political conflict between the state and the federal government. It will 
also describe the attempts by Congress to protect the subsistence re-
sources in Alaska, as well as the Alaskan Legislature's attempts to im-
plement the federal requirements and the Alaskan Supreme Court's deci-
sions that undermined congressional intentions. This note will recite the 
facts, procedural history, and arguments of the parties involved, and then 
explain the reasoning of the decision of the Ninth Circuit. An equitable 
solution will then be proposed-one that will balance congressional in-
terests in protecting rural priority subsistence rights, while maintaining 
Alaskan state sovereignty by allowing the state to manage the fisheries. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In order to truly understand the situation in Katie John III, one needs 
to have a basic understanding of Alaskan geography, history, and 
prevailing opinions, as well as an awareness of subsistence fishing and 
its importance to the rural residents of Alaska. Furthermore, one also re-
quires an explanation of Congress's attempts to give subsistence fishing 
priority and Alaska's attempts to manage its own waterways; only then 
can an in-depth understanding of Katie John lll begin. 
7. See Katie John ll/, 72 F.3d at 700. 
8. See id. 
9. See Don Hunter et. al., Feds Take Fisheries Control, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 2, 
1999, at AI. 
10. Don Hunter, Subsistence Ruling Appealed, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 27, 2000, at 
B I. It is interesting to note that Gale Norton, before her appointment as Secretary of Interior, was 
hired by the state legislature to help overturn Katie John Ill. Liz Ruskin et. al., Interior Nominee 
Familiar With Alaska Issues, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Dec. 30, 2000, at AI. 
II. Katie John v. United States, 216 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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A. Understanding the Alaskan Situation 
The United States bought Alaska from Russia in 1867 and by means 
of the purchase increased in size by 20 percent and added nearly 34,000 
miles of tidal coastland to the country .12 Ever since that time, the federal 
government has had an active presence in the state, from governing 
through military commanders of the War Department to adding nearly 
$2,000,000,000 to the local economy since territorial days. 13 The econ-
omy of the state is dependent upon both the federal government as well 
as the state's natural resources. The top six industries in the state com-
prise nearly ninety-seven percent of the state's economy, and are either 
natural resources or directly related to natural resources: oil, timber, agri-
culture, mining, fishing, and tourism. 14 The oil industry alone "accounts 
for ninety percent of Alaska's total revenues," with the state producing 
nearly twenty-five percent of all the oil produced in the United States. 15 
However, because this note is concerned with subsistence fishing, it is 
important to understand that Alaska is the single largest producer of wild 
salmon in the entire world, harvesting almost 6,000,000,000 pounds of 
seafood each year. 16 With such a large portion of the economy dependent 
upon the natural resources of the state, it is understandable why Alaskans 
are in a constant struggle with the federal government over control of 
these natural resources-the state is fighting for its economic life. 
B. Understanding the Subsistence Right 
Scholars have written "[i]n Alaska, the word 'subsistence' means 
much more than living at a minimum economic level." 17 Unfortunately, 
most of Alaska's natives are doing just that. 18 
12. 29 NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 431 (15th ed. 1998). 
13. This is largely due to the amount of bases and other military installations constructed 
during World War II and the Cold War, but also includes many infrastructure improvements, includ-
ing the Alaskan Pipeline. 
14. Alaska Division of Community and Economic Development (Dec. I, 2000) (visited Feb. 
15, 200 I) <http://www.dced.state.ak.us>. 
15. Karen Bridges, Note, Uncooperative Federalism: The Struxgle Over Subsistence and 
Sovereignty in Alaska Continues, 19 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 131, 131 n.3 (1998). Be-
cause of the state's oil wealth, nearly eighty-five percent of the state's budget is supplied by oil 
revenues. Alaska Division of Community and Economic Development (Dec. I, 2000) (visited Feb. 
15, 2001) <http://www.dced.state.ak.us>. 
16. Alaska Division of Community and Economic Development (Dec. I, 2000) (visited Feb. 
15, 2001) <http://www.dced.state.ak.us>. 
17. Joan M. Nockels, Note, Katie John v. United States: Redefininx Federal Public Lands in 
Alaska, 26 ENVTL. L. 693, 698 (1996). 
18. See Bridges, supra note 15. 
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Nearly half of the state's residents live in and around Anchorage, 
with a population density of almost one square mile per person. 19 Most of 
the residents living in the vast expanse of the state "still must hunt and 
fish for at least some of their food, as many have done for centuries."20 
Subsistence is defined as living off what the land produces, but not being 
limited by the amount or by the seasons.21 In many of the native rural vil-
lages of Alaska, subsistence hunting and fishing has been a way of life 
for centuries and is viewed as a communal activity-often involving re-
ligious rituals.22 It is an integral part of the life of native Alaskans, who 
feel they have a right to subsistence hunting and fishing and are willing 
to fight for that right in court. This explains the determination of Katie 
John and others like her who have pushed the cause for over 15 years. 
C. Congressional Actions 
The federal government and Congress have recognized the impor-
tance of protecting the rights of native Alaskans to subsistence hunting 
and fishing. Beginning with the Alaska Statehood Act of 1958 and con-
tinuing up to 1980, Congress has attempted to protect the native subsis-
tence rights by not only recognizing aboriginal fishing rights, but also 
giving them priority.23 
When Alaska became a state on January 3, 1959, the state received 
from the federal government the opportunity to choose approximately 
102.5 million acres of "vacant, unappropriated and unreserved" land out 
of all the public land. Alaska also received control over fish and game 
regulation on the land it chose.24 In return for the grant, the state of 
Alaska relinquished claims to any land or property of native Alaskans or 
"any land or property that is held in trust by the United States."25 Under 
construction of the statute, "property rights" were interpreted as includ-
ing fishing rights?6 With that disclaimer written into the Alaska State-
hood Act, Congress allowed the native Alaskans to retain their fishing 
rights, thereby protecting them from state claims. 
19. As a comparison, New York City has .003 square miles per person. Alaska Division of 
Community and Economic Development (Dec. I, 2000) (visited Feb. 15, 200 I) <http:// 
www.dced.state.ak.us>. 
20. Bridges, supra note 15. 
21. See Nockels, supra note 17, at 698. 
22. See Mary Kancewick & Eric Smith, Subsistence In Alaska: Towards a Native Priority, 59 
U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 645,649 (1991). 
23. See Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958); ANILCA, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1301-3233 (1994). 
24. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339. 
25. /d. 
26. See Kancewick & Smith, supra note 22, at 654. 
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However, once Alaska began to select their 102.5 million acres, 
problems arose over whether land which was used by natives to hunt and 
fish was actually "vacant, unappropriated and unreserved". Fearing the 
state encroached upon their secured rights to hunt and fish, many native 
Alaskans began filing lawsuits against the state. 27 In 1966, this confusion 
prompted then Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall to temporarily halt 
all sales of gas and oil leases until the claims of the native Alaskans 
could be determined.28 Two years later, the future of Alaska changed 
with the discovery of oil at Prudhoe Bay, which "fueled the ... desire to 
settle Native land claims."29 Congress, recognizing this desire for settle-
ment, passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANSCA)?0 
ANSCA did many things: gave the native Alaskans a $962 million 
settlement;31 divided the native Alaskans into twelve geographic regions 
and villages and established corporations for each region;32 and withdrew 
approximately forty-four million acres of federal land, with the native 
Alaskans choosing the lands?3 However, under ANSCA, the native 
Alaskans relinquished title and rights to hunting and fishing-the very 
rights that were guaranteed under the Alaska Statehood Act. 34 While de-
stroying the right to subsistence hunting and fishing, Congress was con-
fident that native Alaskans would still be protected, expecting both the 
Secretary of the Interior and the State of Alaska to take any action neces-
sary to protect the subsistence needs.35 Congress may have had honorable 
intentions when it removed the rights under ANSCA, but it soon "be-
came increasingly obvious that 'neither the state nor the secretary were 
likely to protect subsistence in the manner Congress had contem-
plated."'36 Congress realized that in actuality it had afforded little, if any, 
27. Bridges, supra note 15, at 141 (citing DAVIDS. CASE, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN 
LAWS 64 (1984)). 
28. See id. 
29. /d. Alaska wanted public lands over which to construct the Alaska Pipeline to the newly 
discovered oil fields. 
30. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (1994). ANSCA stated that Congress found "there [was] an im-
mediate need for a fair and just settlement of all claims by Natives and Native groups of Alaska" 43 
U.S.C. § 160l(a) (1994). 
31. 43 U .S.C. § 1605 (1994 ). 
32. 43 u.s.c. § 1606, 1607 (1994). 
33. 43 U.S.C. § 1610 (1994). 
34. "All aboriginal titles, if any, and claims of aboriginal title in Alaska based on use and 
occupancy, including submerged land underneath all water areas, both inland and offshore, and in-
cluding any aboriginal hunting or fishing rights that may exist, are hereby extinguished." 43 U.S.C. § 
1603(b) (1994). 
35. See H.R. Rep. No. 92-523 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192. 
36. Bridges, supra note 15, at 142 (quoting DAVID S. CASE, ALASKA NATIVES AND 
AMERICAN LAWS 295 (1984)). 
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protection to the subsistence rights of the native Alaskans; something 
else had to be done.37 
Congress recognized its mistake with ANSCA, and in 1980, passed 
the Alaska National Interests Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA).38 One 
of Congress's expressed purposes in enacting ANILCA was "to provide 
the opportunity for rural residents engaged in a subsistence way of life to 
continue to do so."39 Under the act, Congress established a subsistence 
priority right on all renewable resources on federal public lands in 
Alaska.40 This priority was made available to all rural residents, both na-
tive and non-native, "who depend on subsistence resources when it be-
comes necessary to restrict takings on public lands to assure 'the contin-
ued viability of a fish or wildlife population or the continuation of 
subsistence uses of such population."'41 Under ANILCA, the Secretary 
of the Interior was to establish regulations pertaining to the newly pro-
tected rural subsistence priority right, unless the state of Alaska modified 
its existing laws to conform to the newly recognized right.42 If the state 
chose to adopt ANILCA's priority right, the new state laws would have 
to be reviewed by the federal administrative agencies, and even by the 
federal court system if aggrieved petitioners exhausted administrative 
remedies.43 If the state of Alaska wanted to continue to manage the sub-
sistence hunting and fishing on federal public land, they simply had no 
other choice but to conform to ANILCA's requirements. 
D. Alaskan Modifications of Congressional Actions 
With the adoption of ANILCA, the state of Alaska realized it had to 
play by the rules of the federal government if it wanted to retain control 
of fish and wildlife management. In fact, Alaska "was so anxious to 
maintain its role as the sole regulator of fish and game in the state that it 
had enacted a subsistence law of its own two years before Congress fin-
ished the business of fine-tuning ... ANILCA."44 The regulations that 
37. "Congress finds ... in order to fulfill the policies and purposes of the Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act [ANSCA] and as a matter of equity, it is necessary for the Congress to invoke 
its constitutional authority over Native affairs and its constitutional authority under the property 
clause and the commerce clause to protect and provide the opportunity for continued subsistence 
uses on the public lands by Native and non-Native rural residents." 16 U.S.C. § 3111 (4) ( 1994) (cita-
tions omitted). 
38. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (1994). 
39. 16 U.S.C. § 3101(c) (1994). 
40. See 16 U.S.C. § 3114 (1994). 
41. Bridges, supra note 15, at 144 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 3112(2) (1994)). 
42. See 16 U.S.C. § 3115(d) (1994). 
43. See 16 U.S.C. § 3117 (1994). 
44. Katie John v. United States, 1994 WL 487830, at *3 (D. Alaska. Mar. 30, 1994) [herein-
after Katie John II]. 
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were enacted by the state recognized the right to subsistence uses, which 
were defined as "'customary and traditional' uses of wild, renewable re-
sources for direct personal or family consumption."45 After ANILCA, the 
Alaska Board of Fish and Game adopted regulations under which rural 
residents would be given a priority for subsistence hunting and fishing.46 
Because of the new regulations, Secretary of the Interior James Watt cer-
tified state compliance with ANILCA on May 14, 1982, and the state 
was allowed to continue to manage fish and wildlife.47 
Three years later, the Alaska Supreme Court began to rework the 
ANILCA-forced statutes. In 1985, the Alaska Supreme Court in Madison 
v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game held that the subsistence regulations 
adopted by the Alaska Board of Fish and Game, because of the prefer-
ence given to rural residents, were inconsistent with the state laws passed 
in 1978 and therefore invalid.48 According to Assistant Secretary of the 
Interior William Horn, the Madison decision now took the state of 
Alaska out of compliance with ANILCA, and the Department of the Inte-
rior threatened to remove its certification of ANILCA compliance if the 
state legislature did not act to bring the state back into compliance.49 Act-
ing on that warning, the Alaska Legislature, in 1986, changed the laws 
with the sole motivation of compliance with ANILCA.50 The state was 
then able to remain in compliance with ANILCA and retain control over 
the fish and wildlife. 
Three years later, however, the Alaska Supreme Court put ANILCA 
compliance again in jeopardy with its decision in McDowell v. Alaska. 5 1 
The Alaska Supreme Court held that the 1986 subsistence statute vio-
lated sections 3, 15, and 17 of article VIII of the Alaska Constitution (Ar-
ticle VIII prohibits exclusive or special exceptions in fishing and wild-
life).52 Therefore, any subsistence preference or priority as required by 
ANILCA would be held unconstitutional in Alaska. The McDowell court 
recognized that the only way Alaska could retain management of hunting 
and fishing was to amend the state constitution or have Congress change 
the ANILCA requirements.53 Unfortunately, neither option occurred be-
fore the Ninth Circuit decided Katie John Ill. 
45. Bridges, supra note 15, at 146 (quoting ALASKA STAT.§ 16.05.940(23) (Michie 1978)). 
46. Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312, 314 (9th Cir. 1988). 
47. Bobby v. Alaska, 718 F. Supp. 764,813 (D. Alaska 1989). 
48. Madison v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game, 696 P.2d 168 (Alaska 1985). 
49. Bobby, 718 F. Supp. at 813. 
50. 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws 56. 
51. 785 P.2d I (Alaska 1989). 
52. See id. Article VIII, section 3 is the Common Use Clause, section IS is the No Exclusive 
Right of Fishery Clause, and section 17 is the Uniform Application Clause. /d. 
53. See Katie John III, 72 F. 3d at 70 I. 
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III. FACTS 
The Katie John cases did not have such a complicated beginning, but 
once the Ninth Circuit granted the en bane rehearing on July 14, 2000, it 
was the culmination of a long, complicated journey that included suits by 
various individuals in both federal and state court. 
The origins of the Katie John cases began with an eighty-five year 
old Athabascan grandmother named Katie John, who lives in the village 
of Mentasta, Alaska.54 Along with another Athabascan elder, Doris 
Charles, and the Village Council of Mentasta, Katie John sought permis-
sion to continue subsistence fishing. 55 The parties claimed that their an-
cestors had done such "since time immemorial."56 The group sought 
permission for subsistence fishing at a fish camp located at the conflu-
ence of the Copper River and Tanada Creek, which is situated within the 
boundaries of the Wrangell-St. Elias National Park.57 Historically, this 
fish camp was the location of an Athabascan village named Batzul-
netas.58 Batzulnetas was abandoned in the 1940's, although a subsistence 
fishery continued there for many years.59 Finally, in 1964, fishing at 
Batzulnetas was essentially closed when the Alaska Board of Fish and 
Game disallowed the use of nets and fishwheels for subsistence fishing. 60 
Twenty years later, when Katie John, Doris Charles, and the Village 
Council of Mentasta applied to the Alaska State Board of Fisheries for 
permission to reopen Batzulnetas for subsistence fishing, the board de-
. d h 61 me t e request. 
One year later, in 1985, Katie John and the others filed a lawsuit 
against the state of Alaska in federal court under section 807(a) of 
ANILCA.62 She claimed that permitting commercial salmon fishing at 
54. See David Hulen, She Recalls the Past, Fights For the Future: Katie John's Lawsuits 
Against the State and Federal Governments Have Become Landmarks in the Battles Over Native 
Sovereignty and Subsistence Rights, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 25, 1994, at A I. 
55. See Katie John ll/, 72 F.3d at 699-700. 
56. /d. at 700. 
57. Katie John II, 1994 WL 487830, at* 10. To understand the importance of the location of 
the fish camp, the district court explained: 
Tanada Creek is a part of the Copper River system. Approximately 120 known sockeye 
and other salmon stocks ascend the Copper River system every year. The fish stocks mix 
with one another, and at a given time some twenty or more stocks may be migrating up 
the river. The Copper River sockeye stocks are harvested commercially near the mouth of 
the Copper River. 
!d. The Copper River empties into the Prince William Sound, located southeast of Anchorage. 
58. See id. 
59. See id. 
60. See id. 
61. See id. 
62. Section 807(a) allowed for aggrieved parties, after exhausting appropriate state and fed-
eral administrative remedies, to "file a civil action in the United States District Court for the District 
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the mouth of the Copper River while at the same time restricting subsis-
tence fishing at Batzulnetas violated the priority requirement of section 
804 of ANILCA.63 The actual filing of Katie John I instigated negotia-
tions between the parties, resulting in a tentative agreement limiting the 
amount of subsistence fishing at Batzulnetas; however, the suit contin-
ued. 64 In 1988, the Alaska Board of Fisheries formally adopted the 
agreement, allowing a limited amount of subsistence fishing at Batzul-
netas and memorializing the agreement in an official regulation.65 A year 
later, the plaintiffs in Katie John I again pressed the case, requesting the 
district court to grant a preliminary injunction against the new regula-
tions. The district court granted the preliminary injunction in June 
1989.66 The injunction granted full-time subsistence fishing at Batzul-
netas under one of two alternative conditions: fishing would only be al-
lowed from June 1 through September 1 or a limit of 1,000 sockeye per 
year would be imposed.67 Once the actual case was heard by the district 
court, the court ruled that the 1988 regulations of the Alaska Board of 
Fisheries were invalid under ANILCA. The court also ordered the board 
to create regulations that would allow for a priority subsistence fishing 
right at Batzulnetas.68 However, before Alaska could change the regula-
tions, the Alaska Supreme Court decided McDowell. Thus, control was 
lost over subsistence fishing on federal public lands, including the Wran-
gell-St. Elias National Park, which includes Batzulnetas.69 
Since Alaska could no longer manage the wildlife because of non-
compliance with ANILCA, the Federal Subsistence Board stepped in and 
passed temporary regulations mandating priority subsistence fishing on 
all public lands in Alaska.70 However, the temporary regulations that 
were adopted "were essentially the same as the state regulations that [the 
district court] declared invalid in Katie John 1."71 
Again faced with apparently invalid regulations on priority subsis-
tence fishing, Katie John and others submitted petitions to the Federal 
of Alaska to require such actions to be taken as are necessary to provide for the priority." 16 U.S.C. 
§ 3117(a) (1994). 
63. See Katie John v. State of Alaska, No. A85-698 CV (D. Alaska 1989) [hereinafter Katie 
John 1]. Section 804 stated: "Except as otherwise provided in this Act and other Federal laws, the 
taking on public lands of fish and wildlife for non-wasteful subsistence uses shall be accorded prior-
ity over the taking on such lands of fish and wildlife for other purposes." 16 U.S.C. § 3114 ( 1994). 
64. See Katie John II, 1994 WL 487830, at *I 0. 
65. I d. The new regulation was codified as ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 01.647(i) (1988). 
66. Order, June 6, 1989 (No. A85-0698-CV). 
67. Katie John II, 1994 WL 487830, at* I 0. 
68. /d. 
69. See supra note 51. 
70. Katie John II, 1994 WL 487830, at *I 0. 
71. /d. 
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Subsistence Board, arguing reconsideration of the temporary regula-
tions.72 In a surprising decision, the Federal Subsistence Board found that 
Batzulnetas and other fisheries were not under the management of the 
federal government, and therefore, returned control to the state of 
Alaska.73 This decision was based on the location of the fishing camp 
and the recent opinion of the Secretary of the Interior, which adopted a 
narrow definition of public lands, stating, "navigable waters generally 
are not included within the definition of public lands."74 Because Batzul-
netas is near both Tanada Creek and Copper River, both of which are 
navigable, the fishery at Batzulnetas was determined not to be public 
lands and therefore not subject to the subsistence priority of ANILCA.75 
Believing that Batzulnetas was subject to the priority subsistence 
right under ANILCA, Katie John and others filed a complaint against the 
United States and the Secretary of the Interior under section 807(a) of 
ANILCA.76 Unhappy with the situation as well, the state of Alaska also 
sued the federal government, believing that the federal government did 
not have the authority to regulate in this area at all.77 Many other parties, 
also unhappy with the situation, began to sue the federal government un-
der the same issues raised by Katie John and the state of Alaska.78 The 
district court then ordered that all similar citizen cases be consolidated 
and jointly managed with the state's case.79 
The district court, during consultation with counsel from the various 
jointly managed cases, decided to "address the fundamental issue of 
whether navigable waters are public lands before resolving other issues" 
and the various parties presented arguments on only that issue. 8° Katie 
John argued that because of the federal navigational servitude, virtually 
all navigable waters are determined to be public lands.81 Alaska argued 
that navigable waters are not public lands; the federal government agreed 
with that argument prior to oral argument.82 Once before the district 
72. See id. at *II. 
73. See id. 
74. Katie John Ill, 72 F.3d at 701 (quoting 55 Fed. Reg. 27, 114 (1990)). 
75. Katie John II, 1994 WL 487830, at* II. 
76. !d. See supra note 62. 
77. See Katie John Ill, 72 F.3d at 701. 
78. See id. The other cases were: Kluti Kaah Native Village of Copper Ctr. v. Alaska, No. 
A90-0004-CV; Fish & Game Fund v. Alaska Bd. of Fisheries, No. A92-0443-CV; Peratrovich v. 
United States, No. A92-0734-CV; Native Village of Stevens v. Me Vee, No. A92-0567-CV; and Na-
tive Village of Quinhagak v. United States, No. A93-0023-CV./d. at n.4. 
79. See id. at 701. This explains why Katie John, although the first to file suit, was not the 
primarily named plaintiff. 
80. !d. 
81. See id. 
82. See id. 
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court, the federal government changed its argument. Using the federal 
reserved water rights doctrine, the government argued that public lands 
include "those navigable waters in which the federal government has an 
interest under [the reserved water rights doctrine]."83 The United States 
District Court for the District of Alaska, in dismissing the federal gov-
ernment's motions,84 agreed with Katie John and concluded that for the 
purpose of ANILCA, public lands include all navigable waters encom-
passed by the federal navigational servitude. 85 Both Alaska and the fed-
eral government appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.86 
IV. REASONING 
On December 19, 1995, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided 
Katie John III, which reversed the district court, and held that the "sub-
sistence priority applies to navigable waters in which the United States 
has reserved water rights."87 In doing so, the court rejected both the ar-
guments that public lands include all navigable waters subject to the fed-
eral navigational servitude and that public lands exclude all navigable 
waters. 88 
The court's analysis first began with concisely stating the issue on 
appeal: "the sole issue remaining on appeal concerns the meaning of the 
definition of public lands in § 102 of ANILCA."89 The court recited the 
main facts of the case, noting the complexity; it then briefly summarized 
the arguments of each party to the case. 90 
Since the court was looking to a federal agency's decision,91 the 
court recognized that the first step in reviewing an agency's decision is to 
ask two questions under the Chevron analysis.92 The first question is 
"whether Congress 'has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,' 
83. /d. 
84. The two motions before the court were a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Failure to 
State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted (FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)), and a Motion for 
Summary Judgment (FED. R. C!v. P. 56). Katie John II, 1994 WL 487830, at * 18. 
85. See Katie John III, 72 F.3d at 70 I. 
86. See id. 
87. !d. at 700. 
88. !d. at 704. 
89. !d. at 700. 
90. See id. at 70 I. The court likened the arguments to a spectrum where on one end, the state 
of Alaska argued that ANILCA excludes all navigable waters, and on the other, Katie John argued 
that all navigable waterways are public lands. The court also noted that the federal government stood 
on middle ground, claiming that public lands include certain navigable waterways, but only those 
defined by the reserved water rights doctrine. !d. at 702. 
91. This refers to the Federal Subsistence Board's decision that Batzulnetas was not public 
lands, and therefore was not subject to the subsistence priority of ANILCA. 
92. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
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either in the statute itself or in the legislative history."93 The second ques-
tion is "if Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question, [the 
court] consider[s] 'whether the agency's answer is based on a permissi-
ble construction of the statute. "'94 The court answered the first question 
by determining that the language in ANILCA, as well as the legislative 
history "indicate[s] clearly that Congress spoke to the precise question of 
whether some navigable waters may be public lands."95 The court rea-
soned that subsistence fishing is included in the subsistence uses of 
ANILCA,96 and since subsistence fishing has taken place in navigable 
waters in the past, Congress must have intended that public lands include 
some navigable waters.97 However, the question presents itself: which 
navigable waters are public lands? The court found no language or legis-
lative history to guide its decision, and so using the second prong of the 
Chevron analysis, the court had to determine if the federal government's 
arguments that public lands include some navigable waters under the re-
served water rights doctrine is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.98 
The court then examined the three different arguments advanced by 
the parties: the navigational servitude, the Commerce Clause, and there-
served water rights doctrine. First, the court discussed the navigational 
servitude and its application in the current action. The navigational servi-
tude, as the court described it, is an interest the federal government has in 
navigable waterways which is derived from the Commerce Clause.99 
However, the court noted that it had already discussed this in a previous 
case. 100 In City of Angoon v. Hodel, the court found that it "ha[d] held 
that the navigational servitude is not public land within the meaning of 
ANILCA." 101 
The court then looked to the Commerce Clause of the Constitu-
tion. 102 The court noted that although Congress used the Commerce 
Clause to protect subsistence uses of the public lands, 103 there is nothing 
93. Katie John l/1, 72 F.3d at 701 (quoting Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. ICC, 784 
F.2d 959,963 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842)). 
94. Katie John III, 72 F.3d at 701 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843). 
95. Katie John III, 72 F. 3d at 702. 
96. 16 U.S.C. § 3113 (1994). 
97. See Katie John Ill, 72 F.3d at 702. It is important to note that the court limited the federal 
government's ability to "usurp state power over navigable waters elsewhere." /d. at n.9. The court 
noted that this only applies to Alaska in so much as it is interpreting a statute already in place. /d. 
98. See id. at 702. 
99. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
100. City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1986). 
101. Katie John l/1, 72 F.3d at 702 (quoting City of Angoon, 803 F.2d at 1027). 
102. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3. 
103. 16 U.S.C. § 3111(4) (1994). 
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in the language of ANILCA to indicate that Congress wanted to use that 
power to regulate navigable waterways. 104 The court did note one refer-
ence in the legislative history, but dismissed it as "deserv[ing] little 
weight." 105 Since there was no adequate evidence, the court rejected the 
argument that "Congress expressed its intent to exercise its Commerce 
Clause powers to regulate subsistence fishing in all Alaskan navigable 
waters."106 
Finally, the court looked to the reserved rights doctrine. The reserved 
rights doctrine is asserted when the federal government removes lands 
from the public domain and "reserves them for a federal purpose, the 
United States implicitly reserves appurtenant waters then unappropriated 
to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation .... 
[but is limited] to 'only that amount ... necessary to fulfill the purpose 
of the reservation."' 107 In order to determine if the doctrine applies, the 
court looked to the intent of the federal government in making the initial 
reservation and at whether "without the water the purposes of the reser-
vation would be entirely defeated." 108 The federal government had re-
served large amounts of land for specific purposes, and "[i]n doing so, it 
ha[d] also implicitly reserved appurtenant waters, including appurtenant 
navigable waters, to the extent needed to accomplish the purposes of the 
reservations."109 Thus, the court held the definition of public lands in 
ANILCA includes the navigable waterways that the federal government 
has an interest in as a result of the reserved water rights doctrine. 
It is important to note a dissent to the majority opinion. The dissent 
pointed out that on the surface, this may be a simple case, but it is, "un-
fortunately, an incredibly complex issue whose resolution will impact all 
the navigable waters in Alaska." 110 The dissent's recognition of potential 
impact in this decision led her to argue that because of the importance of 
the issue and the uncertainty in the record, the decision should be made 
by Congress. 111 
The majority was somewhat reluctant in deciding the issue-or at 
least aware of the problems this decision causes. In its closing para-
104. See Katie John /11,72 F.3d at 703. 
I 05. /d. The one reference is a statement made by Congressman Morris Udall that public lands 
in ANILCA includes navigable waters in Alaska. 126 CONG. REC. 29260 ( 1980). However, the court 
notes that this statement was made after the Senate had passed ANILCA and after the House had 
debated it. Katie John /11, 72 F.3d at 703. 
106. /d. 
107. /d. (quoting Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976)). 
108. Katie John /11, 72 F.2d at 703 (citing United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700 
(1978)). 
109. /d. 
II 0. /d. at 704 (Hall, J ., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
Ill. See id. at 705-706 (Hall, J., dissenting). 
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graphs, the majority opinion lamented the "extraordinary administrative 
burden" it was now placing on federal agencies. The court also regretted 
as well the "complicated regulatory scheme" of both federal and state 
management, not to mention the expectant hope of cooperation between 
the federal agencies and the state. 112 Finally, in the last paragraph of the 
opinion, the majority declares that this issue "cries out for a legislative, 
not a judicial, solution." 113 The court illustrates two ways in which a leg-
islative solution could be reached: an amendment to the Alaska State 
Constitution that would allow compliance with ANILCA, or congres-
sional modification of ANILCA that would allow for a clear definition of 
public lands. 114 The majority closes its opinion by stating that "[ o ]nly 
legislative action by either Alaska or Congress will truly resolve the 
problem."115 
V. ANALYSIS 
The en bane rehearing of Katie John III will allow the Ninth Circuit 
the opportunity to create an equitable solution to the issue of fish and 
wildlife management in Alaska. That solution should be to stay any deci-
sion it reaches, instead deferring to action by either Congress or the 
Alaskan Legislature. 
Both the Ninth Circuit and the Alaska Supreme Court recognized 
this remedy. In Katie John Ill, the majority closed its opinion by inform-
ing all parties involved that while the court had resolved the issue, the 
better remedy would be for a legislative solution. 116 The dissent also ech-
oed this, as is apparent from the fact that most of its opinion consists of 
an explanation that the judiciary is not "empowered to resolve the issue 
without direction from Congress." 117 The Alaska Supreme Court, in 
holding that the preference of subsistence rights violated the state consti-
tution, stayed its decision to actually allow the legislature to propose an 
amendment. 118 Clearly, a legislative solution to the problem should be 
reached; that solution can either come from Congress or the Alaska Leg-
islature. 
Congress can rectify the problem by further explaining the intent of 
ANILCA and defining what "public lands" are under the act. Alaskan 
Senator Frank Murkowski introduced a bill in the 1041h Congress that 
112. /d. at 704. 
113. /d. 
114. See id. 
115. /d. 
116. See id. 
117. /d. (Hall, J ., dissenting). 
118. See id. at 701. Clearly, the legislature failed to act. 
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would have appointed a Special Master who would have mediated a 
resolution between the federal and state government. 119 Senator 
Murkowski must have known that Congress would not act to further de-
fine ANILCA nor attempt to mediate a settlement. Realizing that the 
only other option would be an amendment to the Alaska Constitution, 
Senator Murkowski introduced a bill in the 1 061h Congress that would 
have provided "for the earliest opportunity for the state to regain man-
agement" of fish and wildlife once Alaska amended its constitution. 120 
The actions of Senator Murkowski not only illustrates Congress's unwill-
ingness to enter into the debate and provide a solution, but also demon-
strates the expectation that Alaska should amend its constitution. 
Not willing to amend the state constitution and realizing Congress 
would not act to resolve the situation, the Alaska Legislative Council and 
some Alaska legislators filed suit against the federal government 
attempting to block federal implementation of the priority subsistence 
right unc1er ANILCA. 121 The district court, after a brief recitation of the 
facts, noted the plaintiff's motivation in bringing this action was "an 
apparent attempt to avoid the ... choice between amending Alaska's 
Constitution to permit implementation of the subsistence priority and 
suffering federal government implementation." 122 The Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit found, in affirming the decision of the district court, 
that the plaintiffs did not even have the requisite standing to sue, thus 
closing the door on any potential judicial solution. 123 With Congress 
unwilling to act and the federal courts not wanting to provide a solution, 
there existed only one more solution: amend the state constitution. The 
choice the Alaska Legislative Council and the legislators had hoped to 
avoid was now before them-if Alaska would manage fish and wildlife 
in the future, the state had to amend its constitution. 
The Alaska Supreme Court stayed its decision in McDowell with the 
expectation that the state legislature would act. Twelve years later, 
Alaska is finally in a position to amend the state constitution to allow a 
119. Alaska Subsistence Hunting & Fishing Act, S. 2172, I 04th Cong. (1996). The bill was 
read twice and then referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, where it "died." 
U.S. Congress on the Internet (visited Feb. 15, 2001) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. 
120. S. 1826, I 06th Cong. (1999). Unfortunately, the bill also "died" in the Committee on En-
ergy and Natural Resources. U.S. Congress on the Internet (visited Feb. 15, 2001) <http:// 
thomas.loc.gov>. 
121. See Alaska Legislative Council v. Babbitt, 15 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 1998), ajf'd, 
Alaska Legislative Council v. Babbitt, 181 F.3d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The Alaska Legislative 
Council is a permanent interim committee and agency of the legislature. ALASKA STAT.§ 24.20.010 
(Michie 2000). 
122. Alaska Legislative Council, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 22. 
123. See Alaska Legislative Council, 181 F. 3d at 1333 . 
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priority subsistence right. 124 In the past two years, there has been a grow-
ing majority of Alaskans that favor an amendment to the state constitu-
tion allowing the priority subsistence right. 125 Governor Tony Knowles, 
in 1999, called for a special legislative session to specifically address the 
issue; the governor hoped to head off the federal takeover. 126 The Alaska 
House of Representatives passed the proposed amendment, which would 
have given a priority to rural subsistence hunters and fishermen, but the 
Senate rejected the amendment by two votes. 127 At that point, Governor 
Knowles was willing to wait until after the 2000 elections to reintroduce 
the proposed amendment. 
Now, after the elections, the possibility of the passage of the pro-
posed amendment seems even more likely. In the recent elections, the 
state legislature has made a shift to the moderate side of the political 
spectrum, and that shift, some argue, "could make a difference when ... 
the long-debated constitutional amendment" comes up again for consid-
eration.128 That opportunity arose almost immediately with the new legis-
lature-on the first day of the new legislative session, House Joint Reso-
lution No. 4 was introduced.129 The resolution is a proposed amendment 
to the Alaska Constitution that would recognize a priority for subsistence 
users in any replenishable natural resource. 130 With the ideological shift 
of the legislature, the proposed amendment could finally be approved by 
the legislature and be voted on by the Alaskan people. If such a circum-
stance happens, the amendment would most surely pass, given the past 
overwhelming support of the majority of Alaskans. 
124. It is important to note that the state has been in this position before. Beginning in 1993. 
and continuing to the present day, there have been twenty attempts to bring the constitutional 
amendment to the people for ratification (House Joint Resolution 23 in the 18th Legislature; House 
Joint Resolution 14 and Senate Joint Resolution 2 in the 19th Legislature; House Joint Resolution 3, 
I 0, 46, I 0 I, I 02, 20 I, Senate Joint Resolution 2, 6, 31, 10 I, and 20 I in the 20th Legislature; House 
Joint Resolution 4, 201, 202, and Senate Joint Resolution 36 and 201 in the 21st Legislature; and 
House Joint Resolution 4 in the 22nd Legislature). Alaska Legislature Online (Jan. 25, 2001) (visited 
Feb. 15, 2001) <http://www.legis.state.ak.us>. 
125. A Dittman Research Corp. poll conducted June 7-11, 1999 found that 72% of Alaskans 
support a constitutional amendment giving a rural priority to subsistence rights, while only 24% 
would not support the amendment. Governor Tony Knowles on the Web (Jan. 25, 2001) (visited 
Feb. 15, 2001) <http://www.gov.state.ak.us/subsistence_amendment/>. 
126. See Tony Knowles, Katie John Appeal is About State Sovereignity; Compass, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 3, 2000, at 12B. 
127. See id. This amendment is found at H.R.J. Res. 202, 21" Leg., I" Spec. Sess. (Alaska 
1999). 
128. Martha Bellisle, New Lawmakers Could Reshape Juneau Agenda, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, Nov. 9, 2000, at lB. 
129. Alaska Legislature Online (Jan. 25, 2001) (visited Feb. 15, 2001) <http:// 
www.legis.state.ak.us>. 
130. !d. The resolution was read and then referred to the appropriate committees. 
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However, the state legislature might not receive such an opportunity 
to amend the state constitution if the Ninth Circuit decides the issue be-
fore the legislature can act. The Ninth Circuit, if it chooses to heed the 
advice of both the Alaska Supreme Court as well as the recommenda-
tions of Judge Wright and Judge Hall, 131 brethren of their own circuit, 
should stay whatever decision the court renders until the legislature acts. 
After all, the issue raised cries out for a legislative and not a judicial so-
lution. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In December, 2000, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard en 
bane an appeal from Katie John III. The Katie John Ill court found that a 
preferential subsistence right, as guaranteed by ANILCA, applied to all 
navigable waters in which the United States has an interest under the re-
served water rights doctrine. The decision meant that management of 
subsistence hunting and fishing would now be the responsibility of the 
federal government because the state was out of compliance with 
ANILCA-a significant problem for Alaska because it is extremely pro-
tective of its natural resources and wants management of those resources 
left solely to the state. As discussed, the court recognized a potential so-
lution: action by the Alaska state legislature. The state legislature merely 
needs to amend the state constitution to allow a priority in subsistence 
rights. Some commentators have argued that it "may [be] a very long 
wait before ... any resolution of this complex issue" occurs from legisla-
tive action. 132 However, with the current trends in Alaska state politics 
and a recognition that the majority of Alaskans support a constitutional 
amendment, that very long wait may have finally come to an end. 
The Ninth Circuit should allow the state to amend its constitution 
and stay any decision it reaches until the new, moderate state legislature 
has an opportunity to amend the state constitution. Once it does, Alaska 
will be able to once again be the sole manager of the fish and wildlife in 
the state. Under such circumstances, Katie John will have a constitution-
ally protected right to subsistence fishing and the state of Alaska, again 
in compliance with ANILCA, will regain its state sovereignty in fish and 
wildlife management. 
Ryan T. Peel 
131. Judge Eugene A. Wright wrote the majority opinion in Katie John Ill, while Judge Cyn-
thia Holcomb Hall wrote the dissent. 
132. Bridges, supra note 15, at 158. 
